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Abstract: Karl Popper believes that science does not necessarily seek to 
unveil the truth. He does not assert that the unending formulations and 
testing of hypothesis or theories will ultimately generate truth or 
certainty. On the other hand, the image that science likes to project of 
itself is that of rationality per excellence. Armed with a special tool called 
the “scientific method”, the institution of science believes it now possess 
the tool with which it could now generate logic of justification and 
certainty. This tool or method is what Magee calls “the Hallmark of 
science”. This study examines the rationality of the claims of the 
scientific enterprise in the light of Kuhn‟s, Feyerabend‟s and Popper‟s 
conception of “Verisimilitude” with the view to showing how 
problematic the whole idea is. In all, we shall present Poppers‟ 
verisimilitude concept as a more rational ideology that the scientific 
enterprise should adopt in place of what is presently conceived as the 
hallmark of science.   
Key words: Verisimilitude, Hallmark, Justification, Scientific Enterprise, 
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Introduction 
But I shall let the little I have 
leant go forth into the day in 
order that someone better than I 
may guess the truth and in his  
 
 
work may prove and rebuke my 
error. At this I shall rejoice that 
I was yet a cause whereby such 
truth has come to light”. 
(Popper, 2002:2)                                                                                                
- Albert Durer 
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The image that the scientific 
community likes to project of itself, 
and indeed the image that most of us 
accept of that community is that of 
rationality per excellence. The 
scientific community sees itself as the 
very paradigm of institutionalized 
rationality. The institution of science 
has therefore claimed to possess a 
special tool, what they now called, 
“the scientific method” which 
generates a logic of justification. By 
this they mean to provide a technique 
for an objective appraisal of the merits 
of scientific theories. This special tool 
is expected to aid scientists in the 
discovery of new theories. 
 
Over the years, philosophers of 
science in the twentieth century have 
accepted this image and have 
considerably made efforts in analyzing 
the assumptions that the realities of the 
situation at least approximate to the 
image. But this position Popper found 
very fallacious. It was in this that 
Popper opined that “the history of 
science, like the history of all human 
ideas, is a history of irresponsible 
dreams; of obstinacy, or error. But 
science is one of the ways, a few 
human activity-perhaps, the only one-
in which errors are systematically 
criticized and fairly often, in time 
corrected”. (Popper, 1963:216; Wogu, 
2011:279-280). 
 
I believe that this overwhelming 
popularity of this image of science 
arises in part from the great success of 
recent science, particularly physics. 
But this notwithstanding, this image of 
science has recently come under attack 
from various historians, sociologists 
and philosophers of science. 
Feyerabend, for instance regards the 
implicit beliefs in this image as not 
merely unjustified but as positively 
pernicious, it was to this end that his 
work on Against Methods, argued that 
society needs to be freed from this 
strangling hold of an ideologically 
petrified science. For Kuhn, he saw a 
need for a revolution in science, 
Feyerabend and others, believed the 
scientific enterprise   could and have 
not lived up to the image which the 
community projects of it. What they 
have so far held in high esteem is in 
popular channels, said to embody 
untenable assumptions concerning the 
objectivity of truth; the role of 
evidence and the invariance of 
meaning (Wogu, 2011293-295). 
Consequently, the image is not even 
capable of serving as an ideal which 
the practice of science ought to aspire 
to realize. This in my candid opinion - 
alongside some other scientists, 
historians and philosophers to whom I 
shall be making reference to - hope to 
show how out-of- line this thinking 
has become. I shall also attempt to 
show how this thinking is largely 
responsible for the philosophical 
problems that are today, rooted in the 
community of science. 
 
The philosopher whose ideas shall 
form the main source of my arguments 
is Karl Popper. I shall also consider 
the work of Feyerabend, Kuhn, 
Lakatos and some others who have 
reasoned along this line of thought 
with the view to showing that the 
claims the scientific community holds 
as regards being the only avenue 
through which truth about reality can 
be reached, is more problematic than 
being correct. 
 
The Conceptions of Science 
For the nature of work proposed for 
this study, it seems most appropriate, 
reasonable and logical to begin with a 
working definition of science. This 
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may not be an easy task knowing that 
there is no standard definition of the 
term “science”. Consequently instead 
of looking for a definition of science, I 
believe it is most appropriate to look at 
various conceptions of science. 
 
Literally, and according to various 
dictionary definitions, “the term 
science means knowledge arranged in 
an organized manner, especially 
knowledge derived from experience, 
observation, and experimentation”. 
(Udugwomen, 1992:20)
 
 For this 
reason, it is often claimed that 
scientific knowledge is proven 
knowledge. Science is thus based on 
what we can see, touch taste, hear or 
smell. Invariably, what this means is 
that personal opinions, prejudices or 
preferences, superstitious and 
speculative imaginations have no place 
in science. 
 
From this conception, it is clear that 
science is a discipline. It also shows 
“that science is characterized by 
systematicity and comprehensiveness. 
It has characteristic methods, 
addresses specific types of questions, 
advances specific types of answers and 
carries with it a kind of results (often 
changing) as well as characteristic set 
of propositions (also sometimes 
changing)”. Ratzsch, (1986:14). 
 
Science has been broadly classified 
into two, namely real science and 
formal science. While the formal goes 
after sensory realities or empirical 
data, the later goes after abstract 
structures or entities, while the former 
achieves its result from and through 
experience, observation and testing of 
facts, the latter achieves its results 
through logical reasoning. Included 
within the preview of real science are 
the natural science, the social sciences, 
the cultural science and formal logic. 
The three concepts, according to the 
first conception of science still under 
consideration, namely the empirical, 
the objective and the rational are 
central to real science. In other words, 
real science must possess empirical 
base, objectivity and rationality. 
A genuine science must therefore be in 
tune with relevant facts or empirical 
data by senses or by empirical process. 
Secondly, the empirical base of 
science cannot be an arbitrary one. 
Thirdly real science requires that there 
be some rational connection between 
empirical data and explanatory theory. 
 
From these conceptions of science, the 
following working definition of 
science emerges: science is a 
theoretical explanatory discipline 
which objectively addresses natural 
phenomena within the general 
constraint that: 
1. Its theories must be rationally 
connectable to generally 
specifiable empirical 
phenomena and that, 
2. It morally does not leave the 
natural realm for concepts 
employed in the explanations 
(Ratzsch, 1986:15).  
Another conception intended for 
consideration in this paper is one that 
identifies science with scientific 
methods. This conception recognizes 
experimentation as the only authentic 
procedure of observing the 
consequences of events and 
circumstances over which man is 
incapable of controlling or 
manipulating. A conception such as 
this makes no room for sciences like 
geology and astronomy (which are 
generally considered as exact 
sciences). Apart from that, it tends to 
undermine the strong theoretical and 
logical flavor needed to hold together 
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the results of observations and 
experiments. 
 
On the other hand most philosophers 
conceive of science as a systematic 
process of searching for the truth about 
nature through logical interferences 
from empirical observations and 
testing. This conception involves 
drawing a generalization from 
instances which have been observed to 
occur several times. In a general sense, 
“observations are made using the 
sense organs to collect impressions; 
pre-requisite conditions for 
observations include the ability to 
imagine, curiosity to investigate and 
motivation to search for explanation”. 
Okoroji, 1988:35) The outstanding 
future of this conception is that, while 
the conception enables the scientist to 
piece together his observations in an 
orderly manner, the resolutions that he 
reaches are not considered all-
embracing since it is practically 
impossible to make all observations 
concerning a phenomenon. The 
scientist obviously and actually jumps 
in to conclusions without waiting for 
further confirming instances. In 
situations like this, past and repeated 
observations generate a confidence in 
the future reoccurrence of the 
phenomenon. 
 
A general statement is then formulated 
concerning the phenomenon. This is 
what is taken as a hypothesis. This 
hypothesis is a tentative law 
considering its range of application 
and this provides a basis for future 
observations. 
 
As more and more instances are found 
based on the initial phenomenon, a 
hypothesis gradually develops into a 
theory. Though more confirmation 
will help to sustain the truth of the 
theory, it will not totally prove that the 
theory is true. As will be shown later 
in this paper, the study will argue that 
“this conception of science which is 
inductive in its modus operandi is 
replete with insurmountable 
difficulties. Chief among which is the 
problem of inductive leap i.e. “the leap 
from the known to the unknown”, 
“from the finite data of experience to 
an indefinite datum”. (Udugwomen, 
1992:24) 
 
Scientific Methodology 
The enterprise of science has been 
progression ever since it began to 
evolve into its modern form from the 
16
th
 century to date. Discoveries have 
been noted to follow a pattern or 
procedure which can roughly be called 
scientific methodology. This 
procedure involves various elements 
such as observational procedures, 
patterns of arguments, methods of 
presentation and calculation and the 
evaluation of the grounds of their 
validity from the points of view of 
formal logic, practical methodology 
and metaphysics. 
The general procedure held to be 
successful involves five major steps 
namely: 
1. Problem formulation: Here 
questions are raised concerning 
the occurrence of certain 
phenomenon. 
2. Design and planning of Research: 
At this stage attempts are made to 
find solutions to the steps raised 
in 1, above. The attempts to do 
this leads to the formulation of 
hypothesis. 
3. Collection of Data: This involves 
going to the field to collect data: 
which are ultimately taken to the 
laboratory for analysis. 
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4. Analysis of Data: this involves 
testing the collected data through 
actual experimentations.   
5. Conclusion: if the results are 
successful, the findings so made 
can be presented as a seminar 
paper or published as a text book 
or in a learned journal. These 
findings serve as a paradigm for 
future research work. 
 
The Problem with Scientific 
Methods 
Inductivism 
According to some scientists, 
Chalmers, (1982), Black, (1973) 
science is principally concerned with 
establishing general laws. These 
general laws are defined from a great 
number of particular observations or 
facts of experience. For instance, if we 
represent the various facts that has 
been established as r, s, t, u; while T 
stands for the theory (or general laws) 
derived from them. The supposed 
relationship between the facts and 
theories may be represented in the 
following chart below: 
r is a fact 
s is a fact 
t is a fact 
u is a fact 
therefore T is a valid theory. 
The above representation gives us a 
picture of what scientific knowledge is 
and what scientists do. Specifically, 
the method of Induction applied here 
shows that science is not based on 
speculative imagination but on what 
can be observed i.e. what can be seen, 
touched, heard etc. From this 
perspective, we infer that “scientific 
knowledge is reliable knowledge 
because it is objectively proven 
knowledge” Chalmers, (1982:1).  This 
conception of how scientific laws or 
theories are arrived at is what we call 
INDUCTIVISM. Let us also mention 
here that this popular conception of 
science first gained currency during 
the great scientific revolution of the 
17
th
 century which was brought about 
by the pioneering works of scientists 
such as Galileo and Newton. 
 
Inductive reasoning involves the 
movement of a limited number of 
observable statements to the 
justification of universal statements. 
Science for the naïve intuitivist is 
based on the principle of induction. To 
this end Chalmers states the principle 
of induction as: “if a large number of 
“A‟s” have been observed under a 
wide variety of all conditions, and if 
all these observed “A‟s “without 
expectations, possessed the property 
B. Then all “A‟s” have the property 
“B”. (Chalmers, (1982:5).  It is on this 
premise that the naïve inductivist think 
of scientific knowledge as a building 
resting on the secure basis provided by 
observations. This position which was 
hotly criticized by Popper, forms the 
foundation for the issues intended for 
discursion in this paper later on. In 
support of the inductivist claims, 
Chalmers further notes that: 
 
As the number of facts established 
by observation and 
experimentation grows and as 
facts become more refine and 
esoteric due to improvements in 
our observations and experimental 
skills, so more and more laws and 
theories of ever more generality 
and scope are constructed by 
careful inductive reasoning. The 
growth of science is continuous, 
ever onward and upward as the 
foundations of observational data 
is increased (Chalmers, 1982:5)  
Advocates of the principles of 
induction hold the view that a 
distinctive future of induction is the 
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use of inductive reasoning. They claim 
that the inductive method of scientific 
enquiry is far more superior to the 
deductive method because it is 
integrally connected with the 
discoveries of scientific laws and 
theories. They buttress their claims by 
saying that whereas the inductive 
methods enables us to make a leap 
from the infinite data of observation to 
laws covering all that are (i.e. known 
present) and all that will or could be 
(i.e. predict the future), the deductive 
method can never advance to 
knowledge of the hitherto unobserved. 
Max Black seems to be in support of 
this when he said “the so called 
inductive leap (from “some” to “any” 
and “all”) seem indispensible in 
science no less than in ordinary life” 
(Black, 1973:157).  
The Problem with The Inductive 
Method 
The search for uniformity in nature, 
and hence natural laws, has been 
central to scientific investigation since 
the time of Archimedes. It was 
Frances Bacon who first described the 
way scientific investigation is to be 
pursued. Bacon was dissatisfied with 
“the powerlessness of deduction to do 
more than render explicitly the logical 
consequences of generalization 
derived from external sources” 
Edward, (1967:94). He thought, “If 
recourse to intellectual intuition or to 
self-knowledge is repudiated as a 
source of actual knowledge, nothing 
better seems to remain than reliance 
upon the empiricist principle that all 
knowledge concerning matters of fact 
ultimately derives from experience.” 
(Edward, 1967:94:11-12;
 
Wogu, 
2010:266-268).
 
Bacon maintained that 
the aim of science is to move further 
and further away from ignorance. To 
achieve this, the scientist begins to 
carry out experiments. Depending on 
the outcome of his experiment, he may 
record his findings or cause them to be 
published. In the cause of time, he and 
other thinkers in the same scientific 
community, to put it in the language of 
Thomas Kuhn, would have 
accumulated a lot of similar shared 
and reliable data. As these data grows 
- to put it in the language of Magee - 
general features begin to evolve and 
the individual scientist began to 
formulate a general hypothesis. After 
this has been done, he begins to look 
for confirming or supporting instances 
of the hypothesis. If a good number of 
such confirming or supporting 
instances are found, then he has 
discovered a scientific law which will 
help mankind in discovering more of 
the secrets of nature. Thus, according 
to Bryan Magee, the existing stock of 
scientific knowledge is added to 
already existing knowledge and 
ignorance is further pushed 
backwards. (Magee, (1973:11-12)
  
According to Magee, “the method of 
basing general statements on 
accumulated observations of specific 
instances is known as induction, and is 
seen as the Hallmark of science” 
(Magee, 1973:12).  In Magee‟s 
opinion, it is the use of the inductive 
method criterion that serves to draw a 
line of demarcation between science 
and none science, between scientific 
methods and none scientific methods. 
He says further that since scientific 
statements are based on observation of 
facts, they alone provide sure and 
certain knowledge. He concludes by 
saying that since science is a body of 
certain knowledge, the growth of 
science consists in the endless addition 
   36 
 
Wogu I. A. Power et al                                                                                                          CIJP (2016) 1(2) 31-41      
 
of new certainties to the already 
existing evidence.    
However, good as this account of 
induction may seem, a problem 
however arise when we ask whether 
induction can be justified. That 
induction is fallible, is very obvious, 
even to common sense. Critics might 
seem to ask how we can be sure that 
the position of the intuitivist is 
stronger than that of the gambler who 
has had a sequence of throws. Can we 
possibly know that the law of 
gravitation will continue to hold true? 
The answer to these questions is a 
“Yes” and a “No”. “Yes” because it 
may turn out to hold true in future, but 
“No” because it is possible that 
tomorrow‟s observation may go 
contrary to the direction the present 
evidence points. After all, much 
uniformity that has occurred in the 
past does not occur today. 
 
The Versimilitude Concept 
From all the issues raised above, it will 
interest you to know that Popper 
believes that science does not 
necessarily seek to unveil the truth. 
For truth in this context can‟t be seen 
from within the ambit of science. He 
does not assert that the unending 
formulation and testing of hypothesis 
or theories ultimately generate truth or 
certainty. Through the fact of the 
refutations of our earlier theories, 
science enables us to know that the 
world as we perceive it to be is not the 
world as it is. For Popper therefore, 
although we may aim at the target (i.e. 
the truth) with the arrow of modus 
tollens, nevertheless we may never 
know when we have hit the target. So 
rather than devise a theory of realism 
founded on a doctrine of truth, Popper 
had proposed a concept called 
“verisimilitude” by which the “truth 
likeness” of hypothesis or theories 
could be determined. In his exact 
words he writes: 
If we have empirical statements, 
then the class of the statements 
it entails is called its “truth 
content” and the gut of false 
statement it entails is called its 
“falsity content”. The 
verisimilitude is determined as 
truth content minus „falsity 
content‟. The verisimilitude of 
two theories which offer 
competing explanations of the 
same phenomena may thus be 
supposedly compared if one of 
them explains or account for 
that which the other explains 
and also offer some additional 
phenomena; and the first theory 
has stood up to test in the extra 
domain where the second theory 
is unsuccessful, or which it does 
not cover (Oldroyd, 1986:77-97)  
When we subject the views of Popper 
to verisimilitude concepts we discover 
that his concept of corroboration, 
which he defined simply as the degree 
to which a theory is “falsifiable”, 
further supports this concept of 
verisimilitude. The degree to which 
theories are falsifiable is one that has 
brought about the seeming progress in 
science. This factor he opines, has 
further caused scientists and 
philosophers alike to continue in the 
quest for reality, truth and perfection. 
One final position which Popper 
believes may never be attained if 
science must continue to strive for 
relevance. It‟s thus important to 
highlight the fact here that Popper 
conceived of scientific changes in the 
light of the indications of Hypothetic -
deductive methodology which has been 
often called “fabricationist 
methodology”.  
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It is important to note also that this 
concept of verisimilitude and 
corroboration personified in 
falsificationism is indeed anti-
inductivistic, in that It completely 
rejects the claim of the inductivists 
(especially positivistic inductivists) 
who  are of the opinion that theories 
are verified, confirmed, or established 
as true or probable on the basis of 
observational evidence: let us note that 
this very point is the principle on 
which the methods of scientific 
discovery and explanations are hinged 
upon. 
 
Following this view, adhoc hypothesis 
and theories that fail crucial tests as a 
result of contradicting basic 
statements, must be abdicated. This 
methodology reveals that science 
progresses by proposing highly 
falsifiable hypothesis or theories 
which they in turn attempt to falsify. 
The advancement in knowledge in the 
scenario between Newtonian physics 
and Einstein new physics of relativity 
offers a vivid example. This paper 
further notes that one additional factor 
that influenced Popper is the fact that 
Einstein did not consider his scientific 
discovery to be final or providing truth 
in its entirety. To this end, Einstein 
offers up his discovery to the crucial 
test. Popper saw in this action as an 
unwillingness to join in upholding 
dogmatic attitude which was prevalent 
among thinkers. (Marx, Freud, Adler 
to mention but a few in that 
dispensation) are some of thinkers 
who Popper disagreed with. This 
further explained why Popper said: 
I can therefore gladly admit that 
falsificationists as myself, must 
prefer an attempt to solve an 
interesting problem by a bold 
conjecture, even (and especially) 
if it soon turns out to be false, to 
any recital of a sequence of 
irrelevant truism. We prefer this 
because we believe that this is 
the way in which we can learn 
from our mistakes and that in 
finding that our conjecture was 
false, we shall have learnt much 
about the truth and shall have 
got nearer to the truth. (Popper, 
1963:231) 
From the quotation above, we are told 
that we learn from our mistakes and 
that science thrives through trial and 
error. Because of the logical 
impossibility of deriving laws and 
theories from singular observations, 
and logical possibility of the deduction 
of their falsity from same, 
falsificationism becomes the Hallmark 
of science. We therefore see a great 
similarity in the contribution of 
Lakatos who agrees that the goal of 
science is to increase verisimilitude 
and corroboration. Lakatos, (1978:32) 
 
Kuhn’s Idea Of Verisimilitude 
For Kuhn, the great debate in 1965 
between Popperians and Kuhnians 
exposed the divergence in the views of 
both men. In Kuhn‟s most influential 
work entitled, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolution (Kuhn, 1970:19), 
he preoccupied himself with 
developing a theory of science that 
will be in line with historical 
situations, The character of scientific 
progress and the sociological 
characteristics of scientific 
communities. There we believe are the 
key features in the Kuhnians model. 
 
Despite the differences that existed 
between Popper and Kuhn, Kuhn‟s 
argument that the history of science is 
the study of discontinuous and 
incommensurable paradigm, to a large 
extent, in the opinion 0f this paper, 
aligns with the main themes of the 
verisimilitude concept. Kuhn‟s 
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rejection of all forms of 
falsificationism on the grounds that all 
paradigms, irrespective of their 
landmarks in history, cannot hold 
tenaciously to the claims of truth in 
their scientific researches, since after a 
while, the views and ideals of a 
paradigm are abandoned for another, 
despite the presence of adhoc 
hypothesis which are initially 
introduced to suppress such anomalies. 
What Kuhn explains here is the reason 
behind “Paradigm shifts” or Gestalt 
switch. 
 
By implication Kuhn‟s scientific 
revolution holds that scientists cannot 
hold two competing paradigms at the 
same time because, apart from the fact 
that two scientists working on two 
different paradigms will find their 
thoughts incomprehensible, (Oldroyd, 
1986:323)  their paradigms cannot lay 
claims to truth both at the same time. 
By this paper sees a further alignment 
with the Popperian concept of 
verisimilitude irrespective of their 
difference. 
 
Feyerabend’s Idea of Verisimilitude 
Another challenging, yet thought 
provoking accounts of science in 
contemporary times, is the one that has 
been colorfully presented and defined 
by Paul Feyerabend in his famous 
book entitled “Against methods” 
(Feyerabend, 1975). Consequent on 
his ideas in the book, he has been 
known as a methodological anarchist 
because of his belief in the fact that 
“the whole notion of a methodology of 
science is an illusion”. To this end he 
proffered an anarchistic enterprise. 
This proposition was made because he 
believed that none of the 
methodologies adopted by the field of 
science had lived up to expectations. 
More specifically, he argues that none 
of these methods were compatible 
with the history of physics. Put 
differently, he states that all 
methodologies of science have not 
provided adequate rules for the 
guidance of scientific activities 
(Feyerabend, 1975:269). This position 
is further strengthened by the fact that 
all scientific methodology has their 
limitations. To this end, the only rule 
that truly has existed over time, 
according to him, is the rule that 
permits any man to use whatever 
method at his disposal, a situation 
Feyerabend called “Anything Goes”. 
In his own words, he argued that “test 
experiments conducted in the past only 
points to one thing, it speaks against 
the universal validity of any rules. All 
methodologies have their limitation” 
(Oldroyd, 1986). 
 
Feyerabend in his arguments further 
argued against Poppers falsificationist 
methodology. But the point which this 
paper focuses on is that by holding this 
position, Feyerabend without knowing 
it, is aligns with Poppers verisimilitude 
concept for the real essence of 
Feyerabend attack on the methods of 
science is that these methods of 
science at one point in time, have been 
known to be unable to hold down on 
their claims of infallibility as regards 
their attempts to explain reality. This 
certainly explains why their methods 
continue to change every now and 
then. Now where two opposing 
methods are known to hold claims to a 
state of affairs, there is no criterion for 
justifying which indeed is most 
correct. Therefore to Feyerabend, it 
becomes methodologically wrong to 
tie down the field of science to any 
single method. Thus he suggests that 
the best idea is “Anything Goes.” 
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(Feyerabend, 1975:269).  This should 
be the order of the day. 
 
Conclusion 
These claims, in the opinion of this 
paper (Thomas Kuhn, Paul 
Feyerabend, etc) goes to corroborate 
Poppers verisimilitude thesis which 
holds, among other things that, the 
field of science in all her endeavours 
and quest to explain reality, as it 
pertains to the truth position of things 
or state of affairs, “science”, can only 
come close to the truth of things or of 
“a truth”, but not “the truth”. 
(Popper, 1963) This mostly is because 
of the reasons we have previously 
discussed in the pages above. A 
typical example is portrayed in the 
methodologies used by Galileo, 
Newton and Einstein. Their methods 
were never the same yet they produced 
outstanding results. Where science 
attempted to enforcing a particular 
method on their scientists, such moves 
were known to further perpetuate the 
errors which other previous scientists 
had been known to make. 
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